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On June 22, 1999, Maine attorney Peter Thompson reluctantly called
two of his clients to inform them that he was dropping their employment
discrimination cases.' Thompson bluntly explained to his two diabetic
clients that the Supreme Court had just declared that diabetics and other
individuals with "correctable" impairments were not individuals with
disabilities, and thus not entitled to the protections of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). As word of the surprising ruling spread, many
attorneys across the nation were no doubt inclined to follow in Thompson's
footsteps. However, Thompson and his colleagues may have picked up the
phone too soon. Though the Court's recent decisions in the correctable
disabilities cases have been a magnet for controversy, the spirited debate
over their normative implications has displaced careful analysis of their
practical legal effects. Closer examination of the language of these opinions
reveals that, despite the advocacy community's understandably panicked
reaction to these decisions, the impact of the Supreme Court's holding on
the scope of the ADA's protections may be significantly narrower than
initial interpretations would indicate.
In Sutton v. United Air Lines,2 Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,3 and
Murphy v. United Parcel Service,4 the Supreme Court rejected the
1. See Maggie Jackson, Rulings Called "Horrible Catch-22"" for Disabled. ATLANTA J.-
CONST., June 23, 1999, at Al.
2. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
3. 119 S.Ct. 2162(1999).
4. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
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predominant understanding of what constitutes a disability under the ADA
and clarified that, in evaluating whether or not an individual is entitled to
the statute's protections, the individual's ability to mitigate or correct his or
her impairment must be considered.' Thus, those individuals who use
medications or medical devices to correct their impairments (or who are
able to compensate for their impairments without the aid of such corrective
measures) may not be entitled to the law's protections. Interpretations of the
decisions in the popular media reveal a widespread perception that the
Supreme Court rendered the ADA powerless in the workplace.'
Newspapers reported alarmingly (and inaccurately) that these decisions
declared individuals with diabetes, cancer, and amputated limbs to be
ineligible for the ADA's protections,7 and one plaintiff reportedly felt guilty
that his suit would cause courts to "throw cases out" and "cost a lot of
people their jobs."8 Indeed, the first handful of lower-court cases decided
under the new Supreme Court precedents seems to confirm the dire
predictions that many individuals with disabilities have "lost their best
protection against employment discrimination." 9
A closer reading of the majority opinions in the correctable disabilities
cases, however, reveals that the majority was keenly aware of the
devastating effect that an expansive interpretation of its holdings could have
on the ADA's beneficiaries. In an explicit attempt to narrow the impact of
the decisions and to clarify the specific nature of its holding, the majority
was careful to identify groups of individuals who would still be entitled to
the law's protections. 0 Notably, the Court emphasized in Sutton-the
leading case in this series of decisions-that one of the rationales
underlying the majority's holding was its belief that viewing disabilities in
their "corrected" or "mitigated" state was the only way to permit courts
and employers to "consider any negative side effects suffered by an
5. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
6. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, A Nearsighted Supreme Court, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., June
29, 1999, at A9 (arguing that the decisions "limited the reach of the Americans with Disabilities
Act beyond recognition"); Supreme Mischief, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A26 (characterizing
the decisions as "deeply disturbing" and arguing that the decisions "significantly weaken" the
ADA's protections, creating a "crabbed version" of the law that ignores its intended purpose).
7. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Ruling Trims the Scope of Disability Law: High Court
Excludes Correctable Impairments from Job Protection, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1999, at I.
8. Lynette Clemetson, A Sharper Image of Bias, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1999, at 27.
9. A Bad Day at the Court, EPILEPSY USA (Epilepsy Found., Landover, Md.), June-July
1999, at 2, 2; see also infra note 74 (citing initial lower-court decisions).
10. See, e.g., Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149 (clarifying that the Court's decision does not exclude
all individuals who utilize corrective devices, that an individual who uses a prosthetic limb may
still be appropriately considered to be an individual with a disability because of a substantial
limitation on her ability to walk or run, and that individuals who use imperfect corrections may
still meet the definition of a disability); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169
(1999) (suggesting that most individuals with monocular vision would "ordinarily" meet the
Act's definition of disability).
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individual resulting from the use of mitigating measures." " Though the
dissent challenged the accuracy of this statement,' 2 the majority's tacit
identification of individuals who use "disabling corrections" as a group
entitled to the protections of the ADA is significant.
As the next wave of post-Sutton ADA litigation begins to focus on what
constitutes a correctable disability,13 courts will undoubtedly encounter both
(1) plaintiffs who argue that their corrective measures are "imperfect" and
(2) plaintiffs who invoke the "disabling corrections" language in Sutton to
argue that the side effects of their corrective measures substantially limit a
major life activity. 4 While the former group of plaintiffs is likely to present
courts with relatively familiar factual disputes about the precise nature of
their individual limitations, courts that encounter disabling corrections
claims will face novel legal questions that have the potential to influence
significantly the practical impact of the correctable disabilities decisions.
Future courts' answers to these questions will determine whether the Sutton
ruling truly "cuts the heart out of the ADA" or whether the decision
merely narrows the Act's applicability in a manner that is consistent with
the goals of the statute's authors.
Sutton's "disabling corrections" language encompasses a wide range of
potential plaintiffs. Individuals who take medications that cause extreme
drowsiness, nausea, or other severe side effects would be appropriately
considered "individuals with disabilities" under this language, as would
individuals who have had corrective surgeries, such as colostomies or
hysterectomies, that give rise to permanently disabling conditions.
Arguably, even drugs that are known to cause birth defects would be
properly considered disabling corrections for the purposes of the ADA. 6 If
courts conceptualize the disabling correction broadly, this interpretation
will partly offset Sutton's constraints on the size of the ADA's protected
class. Sutton could then be read to exclude from the ADA's protections
only those individuals with conditions that are truly minor and easy to
correct, like nearsightedness, and to include most individuals with more
serious conditions, such as epilepsy and diabetes, which often require
11. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at2147.
12. See id. at 2159 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Clemetson, supra note 8, at 27 (predicting that the def-nition of a correctable
disability will be a focal point of future litigation).
14. There is already some indication that plaintiffs are invoking the Sutton opinion to argue
that the side effects of their corrective measures are independently disabling. See. e.g., Belk v.
Southwestern Bell Tel., 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1999); Marasovich v. Prairie Material Sales,
No. 98 C 2070, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18682, at *16 (N.D. I1. Dec. 1. 1999).
15. Clemetson, supra note 8, at 27 (quoting Georgetown law professor Chai Feldblum).
16. The Supreme Court ruled in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), that reproduction is
a major life activity under the ADA. Thus, an individual whose drug therapies increase the risk of
birth defects might be appropriately considered an individual with a disability for the purposes of
an ADA claim, though it would undoubtedly be difficult to demonstrate that the individual was
discriminated against on the basis of that disability.
2000] 1163
The Yale Law Journal
disabling treatments. The effect of the Sutton opinion would be to target the
ADA's protections in a manner that would achieve a proper balance
between the statute's protective goals and the Supreme Court's apparent
desire to reduce frivolous litigation and to protect the autonomy of
employers' decisions regarding the terms and conditions of employment.
The relatively few judicial opinions that have addressed disabling
corrections, however, have not applied that concept expansively. The courts
seem disinclined to view corrective measures as disabilities, especially
when, as is frequently the case, their adverse effects are transient in nature.
At least two courts have even indicated a willingness to second-guess
employees and their doctors by permitting employers to question the need
for and appropriateness of such disabling corrections.
This Note argues that the concept of disabling corrections alluded to in
Sutton has the potential to strike an appropriate balance between the ADA's
rather explicit goal of encouraging and enabling individuals with
disabilities to participate in the workplace and its countervailing goal,
captured in the correctable disabilities cases, of shielding employers and
courts from burdensome litigation filed by plaintiffs with minor or trivial
impairments. This potential will be realized, however, only if the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the lower courts make
a conscious effort to conceptualize disabling corrections broadly and to give
proper deference to the informed judgment of employees who face the
unattractive choice between living with existing disabilities and subjecting
themselves to potentially disabling corrective measures. Part I introduces
the ADA, the correctable disabilities decisions, and the "disabling
corrections" language contained therein. Part II analyzes past federal-court
opinions addressing disabling corrections and discusses the reasoning
behind the apparent disinclination of courts to define such corrective
measures as disabilities under the ADA. Part III suggests that the EEOC
amend its implementing regulations under Title I of the ADA to facilitate
broader applicability of the ADA to individuals who must use disabling
corrections to mitigate other impairments. Finally, Part IV discusses the
importance of judicial and employer deference to the judgment of
employees and their treating physicians in accommodating and protecting
the rights of such individuals.
I. THE ADA AND THE CORRECTABLE DISABILITIES CASES
A. The History and Goals of the ADA
The ADA was enacted in 1990 in response to growing public awareness
and concern about discrimination against people with disabilities and the
effects of such discrimination on the economic and employment
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opportunities available to these individuals. 7 The Act's statutory precursor
was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited "any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance" from discriminating against
an individual "solely by reason of his handicap."' The ADA extends this
nondiscrimination mandate to private employers (Title 1);19 state and local
governments (Title I);2' and other private entities that provide public
accommodations (Title III). In the employment context, Title I prohibits
discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." --
The discriminatory behaviors prohibited by the Act include "limiting,
segregating, or classifying" an individual adversely because of a disability,
using criteria or tests that have a discriminatory effect, and failing to
provide reasonable accommodations to allow an employee with a disability
to participate fully in the workplace. -3
The ADA is unquestionably a pro-work statute. The plain language of
the statute, its legislative history, and the legislative findings included in it
all evince a clear intent on the part of Congress to encourage and enable
individuals with disabilities to obtain and retain employment.' At the time
of the ADA's enactment, numerous studies indicated that the involuntary
unemployment rate of individuals with disabilities was appallingly high.'
This involuntary unemployment was attributed to rampant workplace
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The congressional
committees that considered the ADA in its early stages were influenced not
only by the injustice of such prejudice, but also by the economic
consequences of employers' discriminatory practices. The House
Committee on Education and Labor's favorable report on the Act gave
considerable credence to testimony in the hearing record indicating that the
exclusion of such individuals from participation in the national economy
17. For an in-depth analysis of the origins of the ADA, see Robert L Burgdorf. Jr., The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 415-34 (1991).
18. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504. 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973). The
Rehabilitation Act definition of disability is now the same as the ADA's statutory definition. See
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). The term "disability" is now preferred over the term -handicap,"
although there is no difference in their legal meaning. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485. pt. 2, at 50-51
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-33.
19. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
20. See id. §§ 12131-12165.
21. See id. §§ 12181-12189.
22. Id. § 12112(a).
23. Id. § 12112(b).
24. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope. 74 NoTRE DA.tE L REV. 621,
634-35 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 17, at 420-26 (discussing the results of several studies).
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cost the United States billions of dollars each year.2 6 Such economic losses
were attributable both to the cost of providing social support programs and
to the loss of productivity, earnings, and income tax payments that resulted
from the exclusion of individuals with disabilities from full participation in
the economy. The Committee concluded that "to the extent that the changes
in practices and attitudes brought about by the implementation of the Act
ultimately assist people with disabilities in becoming more productive and
independent members of society, both they and our entire society
benefit." 27
This dual emphasis on autonomy and economic considerations was
incorporated into the statutory findings as well. Congress emphasized that
employment opportunities were critical to "the Nation's proper goals
regarding individuals with disabilities," including the assurance of
"equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency." 28 Moreover, Congress felt that improved
employment opportunities would serve the important national economic
goal of decreasing the "billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting
from dependency and non-productivity" of these individuals.29 These
findings indicate that the ADA was intended to be a pro-work statute and
that Title I's provisions were clearly designed to remedy discrimination that
might prevent individuals with disabilities from participating in the
workplace to the fullest extent possible.
B. The ADA Definition of Disability
Unlike prior civil rights laws, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
targeted a group that is neither discrete nor well-defined. These
antidiscrimination statutes are unique in that plaintiffs seeking to invoke the
laws' protections are not presumptively assumed to be members of the
group that the law was designed to protect. Though it was rare for a
defendant to challenge a plaintiff's ability to meet the statutory definition of
disability in early ADA litigation, there has been a marked increase in the
frequency of such challenges in recent years.3" Today, one of the most
highly contested aspects of the ADA is how the law defines an "individual
with a disability."
26. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43-47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303.
325-29.
27. Id. at 45-46, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 327-28.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
29. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
30. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 24, at 623; Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking
Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68
U. COLO. L. REv. 107, 112-13 (1997).
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Using a three-prong test, the ADA defines a disability as
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
Congress delegated the authority to interpret and implement Title I of the
ADA to the EEOC 2 The Supreme Court noted in Sutton that "no agency
has been delegated the authority to interpret the term 'disability,"' 33
because the definition of the term is contained in a generally applicable
provision of the statute." Nevertheless, the EEOC has promulgated
regulations indicating its interpretation of the ADA definition of disability
in the context of employment.35 These regulations expand on the meaning
of each of the necessary components of the statutory definition of disability:
(1) the existence of a mental or physical impairment' that (2) substantially
limits37 (3) a major life activity.3" The EEOC interpretive guidance that
accompanies these regulations also indicates that a determination of
disability is to be made "without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." 39
C. The Correctable Disabilities Cases
Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in the correctable disabilities
cases, there was significant disagreement as to whether mitigating measures
should be considered when determining whether or not an individual met
31. 42U.S.C. § 12102(2).
32. See id. § 12117(a).
33. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
35. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1998).
36. The regulations define a physical or mental impairment as
[any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological. musculoskeletal.
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs) cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, heric and lymphatic, skin and endocrine or...
[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
l § 1630.2(h)(l)-(2).
37. The regulations define "substantially limits" to mean -[u]nablc to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the general population can perform" or to mean " [s] ignificantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." Id.
§ 1630.20)(1).
38. The regulations define a major life activity to mean "functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
Id. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i).
39. Id. pt. 1630 app. at 347.
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the ADA's definition of disability." Eight circuits had adopted the EEOC's
position that impairments should be evaluated in their uncorrected or
unmitigated state when determining the applicability of the ADA.4' This
position was justified by the agency's view that consideration of
impairments in an unmitigated state best upheld the statutory purpose of the
ADA.42 The EEOC also maintained that disregarding mitigating measures
in a determination of disability was "most consonant with the structure of
the statute, which generally addresses at a stage later than the threshold
determination of disability issues regarding the various adjustments that
may be required to enable a disabled person to work." 43 As the dissent in
Sutton pointed out, the legislative history of the Act also strongly favored
this interpretation.'
Conversely, prior to the correctable disabilities decisions, both the Sixth
and Tenth Circuits had taken the position subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court: that an individual's impairment should be evaluated in its
corrected or mitigated state for the purposes of the ADA.45 These courts
based their rejection of the EEOC position largely on their concern that the
40. See, e.g., Timothy Stewart Bland, The Determination of Disability Under the ADA:
Should Mitigating Factors Such as Medications Be Considered?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 265 (1999):
Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Search
for the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575 (1998); Jonathan Bridges, Note,
Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Interpretation and Deference in
the Judicial Process, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (1999); Elizabeth A. Chang, Note. Who
Should Have It Both Ways? The Role of Mitigating Measures in an ADA Analysis, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 1123 (1998); Sheryl Rebecca Kamholz, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Advocating Judicial Deference to the EEOC's Mitigating Measures Guidelines, 8 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 99 (1998); Michael J. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist
Argument Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123
(1998); Maureen R. Walsh, Note, What Constitutes a "Disability" Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Should Courts Consider Mitigating Measures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917
(1998).
41. See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998);
Washington v. HCA Health Servs., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid
Beverage, 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 863
(1st Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997);
Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co..
102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11 th Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996).
42. See Brief for the United States and the EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
7, Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943), available in 1999 WL 95496
[hereinafter EEOC amicus brief].
43. Id at 8.
44. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Issac S. Greancy,
Note, The Practical Impossibility of Considering the Effect of Mitigating Measures Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267, 1272-74 (1999) (noting
that Congress did not want the courts to consider mitigating measures).
45. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct.
2139; Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit also
declined to defer to the EEOC regulations in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, 123 F.3d
156 (4th Cir. 1997), when the court failed to consider whether an HIV-positive individual would
have been substantially impaired in a major life activity absent the mitigating effects of his drug
therapies. See id. at 183 n.9 (Michael, J., dissenting).
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EEOC's guidelines required courts to inquire into the impact of a corrected
disability in a hypothetical uncorrected state.' Similarly, while the Fourth
Circuit did not explicitly reject the EEOC guidelines prior to Sutton, the
court expressed concern that the EEOC position would debase the ADA by
demanding that the statutory protections available to those with severe
impairments also be made available to those with comparatively minor
conditions.47
Because the Supreme Court's decisions in the "correctable disabilities
cases" rejected the position of the overwhelming majority of circuit courts,
these decisions portend a significant change in the population of individuals
who are accorded protection under the ADA. Reduced to their most basic
holding, Albertsons, Murphy, and Sutton establish that "the determination
of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to
measures that mitigate the individual's impairment."4 Thus, individuals
who can treat or compensate for their impairments and thereby function
"normally" do not qualify for the protections of the ADA. Closer
examination reveals, however, that these opinions contain important
nuances that are not captured in a simple statement of their holdings.
In Sutton-the leading case in this series of decisions-twin sisters
with severe myopia applied for employment with United Airlines as
commercial airline pilots. Both Karen Sutton and her sister, Kimberly
Hinton, had uncorrected vision of 20/200 or worse in both eyes and were
rejected because of United's minimum vision standard, which required
uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better in each eye. The sisters sued
United, claiming that they were rejected because of their disabilities or
because United regarded them as having disabilities. In support of their
contention that they were individuals with disabilities within the meaning of
the ADA, Sutton and Hinton argued that their myopia significantly
interfered with their ability to engage in the major life activity of working.
They claimed that the court should look at their visual impairments in an
uncorrected state, as per the EEOC guidelines. The district court dismissed
their suit, stating that, because their vision was fully correctable, Sutton and
Hinton had not demonstrated that they were individuals with disabilities or
"regarded as" individuals with disabilities within the meaning of the
ADA.49 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed."
The Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's ruling. In examining the
petitioners' contention that the EEOC guidelines required the Court to
46. See, e.g., Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.
47. See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
48. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
49. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, No. 96-S-121, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15106, at 018 (D.
Colo. Aug. 28, 1996).
50. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
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consider their disabilities in an uncorrected state, the Court questioned the
EEOC's authority to issue guidelines interpreting the statutory definition of
disability, noting that the definition of disability was contained in a portion
of the statute that no agency had been specifically authorized to
implement." Though the Court did not ultimately rule on the EEOC's
authority to promulgate guidelines or regulations interpreting the statutory
definition of disability, it found the requirement that a determination of
disability be based on consideration of the individual's impairment in an
uncorrected state to be in conflict with the plain meaning of the statute. 2
The Court provided three justifications for its reading of the statute.
Initially, the majority noted that the first prong of the ADA's three-prong
definition defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an
individual. 3 Because the verb "limits" in this phrase appears in the present
indicative form, the Court ruled that the ADA requires an individual to be
"presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited" in
order to demonstrate a disability under this prong of the definition.'
Second, the Court observed that the statutory definition of a disability
demands an individualized inquiry into the particular effects of the
impairment on the individual's major life activities. The Court suggested
that examination of impairments in an uncorrected state would be less
conducive to such an individualized inquiry because any determination of
the actual practical effect of the impairment would be speculative." The
Court also explained that examination of uncorrected impairments would be
inconsistent with the "individualized inquiry requirement," because it
would not permit courts and employers to consider appropriately the impact
of any negative side effects on the individual's major life activities that
might be caused by mitigating measures. 56 Finally, the Court noted that the
statute's findings include a statement that forty-three million individuals in
the United States were thought to have one or more physical or mental
disabilities. The majority argued that this number would have been much
higher had Congress intended to include "correctable disabilities" within
the statutory definition of a disability.5
In response to the dissent's argument that viewing individuals in their
corrected state created an overly exclusive definition of disability, the
majority emphasized that many individuals who take measures to mitigate
their impairments would still be considered to have disabilities under the
51. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
52. See id. at 2146.
53. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 2147.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 2147-49.
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majority's conception. They pointed out that individuals with prosthetic
limbs, for example, "may be mobile and capable of functioning in society
but still be disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to
walk or run."" The majority clarified that "[t]he use or nonuse of a
corrective device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that
determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with an
impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting."' 9 Thus,
individuals who can correct their disabilities to the point where they can
"function in society" or in the workplace may still be considered to have
disabilities as long as a major life activity (such as walking, seeing,
speaking, or reproduction) is substantially impaired, notwithstanding the
correction.
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that United Air Lines
"regarded" them as having disabilities. Relying upon the EEOC
regulations,' the Court explained that individuals must prove that they are
regarded as ineligible for an entire category of jobs, not just a particular
position, in order to demonstrate that they are perceived to be incapable of
working." In explaining this line of reasoning, the Court pointed out the
petitioners' failure to make "the obvious argument that they are regarded
due to their impairments as substantially limited in the major life activity of
seeing,"" and hinted that claims based on perceived limitations affecting
the ability to work should generally be viewed less favorably than claims
based on other major life activities.6" The Court determined that Sutton and
Hinton had not demonstrated that they were excluded from an entire
category of jobs and thus could not have been "regarded as" having a
disability that significantly limited their ability to work.'
In Sutton's companion cases, Murphy v. United Parcel Service and
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Supreme Court similarly rejected the
ADA claims of individuals whose corrected impairments did not limit a
58. Id. at2149.
59. Id.
60. In this section of the opinion, the majority "assum[ed] without deciding" that the
EEOC's definitional regulations were reasonable, despite their previous questioning of the
authority under which such regulations were promulgated. Id. at 2151. Presumably, the Court felt
that the EEOC's interpretation of the term "substantially limits" was not in conflict with the plain
meaning of the statute. This portion of the majority opinion could be read to indicate that, absent a
conflict with the plain meaning of the statute, the EEOC's definitional regulations and interpretive
guidance are still entitled to judicial deference.
61. See id. at 2151.
62. Id. at2150.
63. See iU at 2151. One commentator has suggested that the judicial disinclination to rule
that an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working has "effectively
emasculated... [this] provision." Locke, supra note 30, at 138. Locke advocates that working
should be eliminated as a major life activity and replaced with a task-based assessment of
impairment. See id.
64. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152.
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major life activity, relying primarily on the language of the Sutton opinion.
In Albertsons, the Supreme Court further clarified its reasoning in Sutton by
noting that an individualized inquiry under the ADA must take into account
not only treatments and corrections (such as medications or devices), but
also the individual's ability to compensate for the impairment, including the
brain's unconscious mechanisms for coping with the disability.65 Though
the plaintiff had a visual impairment that left him with effectively
monocular vision, his brain had developed unconscious mechanisms to
compensate for his problems with depth perception and peripheral vision.
The Court ruled that his visual problems did not necessarily substantially
impair a major life activity and that the Ninth Circuit had not given
adequate consideration to these mitigating measures.'
D. Sutton's Disabling Corrections Corollary
In both Sutton and Albertsons, the majority pointedly emphasized that
the determination of whether or not a person qualified as an "individual
with a disability" under the ADA is a highly individualized inquiry that
should be based not on categorical determinations but instead on an
investigation into the unique challenges faced by that individual.67 The
Court also emphasized its view that deference to the EEOC's mitigating-
measures guidelines would have required "courts and employers to
speculate about a person's condition and would, in many cases, force them
to make a disability determination based on general information about how
an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the
individual's actual condition."6" Such a speculative inquiry into an
individual's potential impairment in an uncorrected state would have led
"to the anomalous result that in determining whether an individual is
disabled, courts and employers could not consider any negative side effects
suffered by an individual resulting from the use of mitigating measures,
even when those side effects are very severe." 69 The Court cited three
examples of such potentially disabling corrections: antipsychotic drugs,
which "can cause... neuroleptic malignant syndrome and painful
seizures"; drugs used to treat Parkinson's disease, which "can cause liver
65. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2168-69 (1999).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 2169; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
68. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
69. Id. (emphasis added). The dissent questioned the majority's conclusion that examination
of disabilities in their unmitigated state would prevent consideration of the effects of disabling
corrections, arguing that in the rare instance in which an individual suffered disabling side effects
in treating an underlying condition that was not, in and of itself, disabling, "it might fairly be said
that ... side effects are symptomatic of a disability because side effects and a physical impairment
may flow from the same underlying condition." Id. at 2159 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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damage"; and anti-epileptic drugs, which can cause "serious negative side
effects."70
With this discussion of the importance of including disabling
corrections in a determination of disability, the Court created an important
corollary to the "rule" that individuals who can utilize corrective measures
to mitigate the effects of their original impairments are not generally
entitled to the ADA's protections.7 ' Lower courts should interpret this
corollary generously in order to harmonize the implicit litigation-limiting
goal of the correctable disabilities cases with the ADA's broader goal of
empowering individuals with disabilities.
Many initial interpretations of the correctable disabilities decisions
have applauded the Court for making a "common sense decision" that will
ensure that the courts are no longer "flooded" with workplace
discrimination claims based on minor or insignificant impairments.' While
there may be reason to question the empirical basis for this fear,' even
assuming that the definition of "disability" espoused by the EEOC and a
majority of the courts of appeals did result in a flood of specious litigation,
any narrowing of the ADA's protected class in response to this extra-
statutory concern should be carefully tailored to eliminate only those
plaintiffs who are manifestly beyond the class of citizens with disabilities
that Congress meant to protect. The disabling corrections corollary limits
the narrowing effect of the correctable disabilities decisions to exclude only
those individuals who can correct their impairments without significant
adverse side effects. By targeting the impact of the correctable disabilities
decisions in this manner, the disabling corrections corollary helps to ensure
that the Sutton decision will clarify, not destroy, the protections of the
ADA. This beneficial outcome will be realized only if lower courts
vigilantly maintain the breadth of the disabling corrections corollary and
thus ensure that meritorious claims are not improperly rejected at the
summary judgment stage.74
70. Id. at 2147 (citations omitted).
71. This "rule" may seem a somewhat oversimplified encapsulation of the holding in the
correctable disabilities cases. Lower courts have nonetheless adopted this interpretation of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions. See, e.g., Baker v. Chicago Park Dist.. No. 98 C 4613, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11225, at *8 n.2 (N.D. II1. July 15, 1999) (noting that "the Supreme Court has
restricted the definition of a disability to conditions that are not medically correctable-).
72. See, e.g., Disability Distinctions, ST. PETERSBURG TiMES, June 26. 1999. at 18A: Jobs
Laws, FIN. TIMES (London), June 25, 1999, at 13 (arguing that federal judges are "overvhclmed"
with employment cases and that "the ruling may safeguard the Act ... already famous for the
frivolity of cases brought under it").
73. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARv. C.RI-C.L. L. REV. 99, 106 (1999); Paul Steven Miller, The Americans with Disabilities
Act in Texas: The EEOC's Continuing Efforts in Enforcement, 34 HOuS. L. REV. 777,790 (1997).
74. There is already a strong indication that lower courts are interpreting the correctable
disabilities decisions in a manner that severely limits the applicability of the ADA to those who
utilize corrective measures. While many courts interpreting Sutton have rejected the ADA claims
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Moreover, a generous interpretation of the disabling corrections
corollary would serve the larger goals of the ADA. As noted above, both
the legislative history of the ADA and the language of the statute itself
indicate that the Act was intended to encourage and enable individuals with
disabilities to work and participate in the economy whenever possible.
Enabling increased participation in the national economy by individuals
with disabilities protects the rights of these individuals and serves national
economic interests as well. Ensuring that individuals who attempt to correct
their disabilities are protected from discrimination in the workplace if these
corrections are themselves disabling will encourage such individuals to take
aggressive steps to mitigate their impairments and thereby enhance their
ability to remain self-sufficient participants in the economy.
II. LOWER-COURT RECEPTIVENESS TO DISABLING
CORRECTIONS PRIOR TO SUTTON
The concept of a disabling correction did not appear for the first time in
Sutton. Some federal courts had already (implicitly or explicitly)
acknowledged that the side effects of corrective measures can constitute a
disability for the purposes of the ADA prior to the Supreme Court's
correctable disabilities decisions." Sutton's explicit statement that those
with disabling corrections are still eligible for the ADA's protections will
undoubtedly increase the frequency with which plaintiffs argue that they are
appropriately considered individuals with disabilities due to a disabling
of individuals who sought to be evaluated in an uncorrected state, see, e.g., Haiman v. Village of
Fox Lake, 55 F. Supp. 2d 886 (N.D. I11. 1999), a few post-Sutton courts also have rejected the
ADA claims of individuals whose corrective measures were malfunctioning at the time of
termination, see, e.g., Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D. Tex. 1999), whose
corrective measures were not prescribed until after the time of termination, see., e.g., Taylor v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 604 (N.D. Tex. 1999), or whose corrective
measures were unable to correct completely the effects of the underlying condition, see. e.g.,
Rutlin v. Prime Succession, Inc., No. 98-CV 117, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8754 (W.D. Mich. June
9, 1999). (Though the Rutlin decision was handed down prior to Sutton, applicable precedent in
the Sixth Circuit at the time instructed trial courts to consider the effects of mitigating measures.)
But see Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining that the
plaintiff was appropriately considered an individual with a disability due to the side effects of his
corrective leg braces); Marasovich v. Prairie Material Sales, No. 98 C 2070, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18682, at *16 (N.D. II1. Dec. 1, 1999) (determining that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the side effects of the plaintiff's medications substantially limited his
ability to work).
75. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997) (Kennedy, J..
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907 (11 th
Cir. 1996); Berk v. Bates Adver. USA, 25 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Hodgens v. General
Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102 (D.R.I. 1997). But cf Lester v. Trans World Airlines. No. 95-
C2349, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10857 (N.D. II1. July 23, 1997) (declining to consider whether side
effects should be part of the determination of disability).
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correction. 76 This shift in focus by plaintiffs is likely to stimulate innovative
responses by employers aimed at narrowing the "disabling corrections
corollary" to the correctable disabilities rule. Future courts will grapple
with difficult questions in attempting to evaluate these claims: How severe
must a side effect be before it should be considered disabling? Should
severe but temporary side effects be considered disabilities for the purposes
of the ADA? May an employer second-guess an employee's choice by
refusing to accommodate corrections that the employer deems to be
unnecessary or inappropriate? Can an employer legitimately fire someone
who refuses to utilize a disabling correction to mitigate an impairment?
Unfortunately, very few precedents exist to indicate how courts will
answer these questions in the future, since the law in eight circuits prior to
Sutton required courts to consider an impairment in its unmitigated or
uncorrected state.77 Under this regime, courts evaluated whether the
underlying impairment was itself a disability; there was no need to consider
the potentially disabling effects of treatments. 78 The few relevant precedents
contain hints of a past judicial reluctance to accept corrective measures as
disabilities, and a corresponding tendency to create a de facto higher
standard of proof for establishing a disability when the impairment stems
from a corrective measure. These cases also indicate a judicial receptivity to
employer arguments that employees who elect to undergo "unnecessary"
or "inappropriate" corrections, however disabling, are not entitled to the
ADA's protections. Judicial tolerance of such arguments is improper.
Acceptance of the former argument runs counter to the ADA's pro-work
policy, while acceptance of the latter has the potential both to impinge
unduly upon the autonomy of individuals with disabilities and to burden the
courts with complex but only marginally relevant factual disputes.
76. See, e.g., Todd, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (involving a plaintiff who, after the Sutton decision.
argued that the side effects of his epilepsy medication were disabling).
77. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
78. For example, in Wright v. City of Tampa, 998 F. Supp. 1398 (M.D. Fla. 1998). a district
court in Florida considered whether an individual with thrombocythemia (a blood disorder that
can cause weakness, dizziness, hemorrhaging, and increased risk of stroke, heart attack, or
embolism if left untreated) was an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Though the blood condition was treated with medication, the plaintiff alleged that the medication
used to treat the condition resulted in chronic headaches and fatigue. See id. at 1399. In ruling on
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court considered the impact of the
thrombocythemia in its uncorrected state and thus found that the plaintiff had presented a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether she met the ADA definition of an "individual with a
disability" due to her blood disorder. See id. at 1402. The court never discussed whether the side
effects of the medicine could have been considered a disabling condition.
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A. The Severity of the Side Effect
Those courts that have examined the applicability of the ADA to
individuals with potentially disabling corrections have determined (quite
logically) that any disabling correction must meet the same statutory
definition of a disability as an uncorrected impairment." Most importantly,
the side effects of the corrective measure must substantially limit the
individual's ability to engage in a major life activity. Courts in post-Sutton
litigation over disabling corrections will no doubt demand that employees
demonstrate that the effects of their corrective measures clearly constitute a
disability before ordering employers to take steps to accommodate such
employees.
Many of these pre-Sutton courts have been reluctant to conclude that a
corrective measure can substantially limit a major life activity. For
example, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have recently held that
individuals who were undergoing treatments for cancer were not
substantially impaired in their ability to work by the side effects of these
treatments. In Ellison v. Software Spectrum,8° the plaintiff alleged that her
position was eliminated because of the lower performance evaluation that
she received while she was working a modified schedule to accommodate
her cancer treatments. The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs attempt to
invoke the protections of the ADA, despite the fact that her radiation
treatments caused "nausea, fatigue, swelling, inflammation, and pain" to
such an extent that she "constantly felt sick and fatigued." 8 Because the
plaintiff admitted that she could perform the essential functions of her job
even while experiencing these side effects, the court ruled that she was not
substantially impaired in her ability to work, and thus was not an individual
with a disability within the meaning of the ADA.8" Similarly, in Gordon v.
E.L. Hamm & Associates,83 the plaintiff alleged that the terms and
conditions of his employment (including his task assignments and his
access to a company car) changed during the time period that he was
working a modified schedule to accommodate his cancer treatments. The
Eleventh Circuit rejected his ADA claim, ruling that the weakness, nausea,
dizziness, swelling, numbness, loss of body hair, and vomiting that the
plaintiff experienced as a result of chemotherapy treatments were not
79. See, e.g., Gordon, 100 F.3d at 911-12; Hodgens, 963 F. Supp. at 108 (using the ADA
definition of a disability to evaluate the disabling impact of side effects).
80. 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 191.
82. See id. at 193.
83. 100 F.3d 907.
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disabling because his doctor found him to be tolerating his treatments
"fairly well" and accordingly certified him as capable of working.'
Courts have also invoked the EEOC regulations to justify findings that
corrective measures were not disabilities.' For example, in Foreman v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.," the Fifth Circuit ruled that a man who used a
pacemaker to correct a heart condition was not substantially impaired in his
ability to work. After the installation of his pacemaker, the plaintiff was
unable to perform the tasks required for his previous position because these
tasks required him to work in close proximity to equipment that might
cause electromagnetic interference with his pacemaker. Nevertheless, the
court held that the restrictions on his activities that the device demanded did
not limit his ability to perform an entire class of jobs as required by the
EEOC regulations.'
Ellison and Gordon may well have been correctly decided, given that
the plaintiff (in one case) and the plaintiff's doctor (in the other) admitted
that the side effects of the chemotherapy did not prevent the plaintiffs from
engaging in the major life activity of "work." After Sutton, however, the
judicial tendency to limit the definition of "disability" to especially severe
side effects of medical treatments is no longer justified. Judicial insistence
on proof of especially severe side effects has a vast potential to shrink the
disabling conditions corollary to the correctable disabilities rule in
derogation of both the ADA and the Sutton dicta.
B. The Duration of the Impairment
The EEOC's regulations directing courts to consider the duration of an
individual's impairment in determining whether that impairment is
"substantially limiting" may prove particularly problematic for claims
based on disabling corrections. Employers faced with such claims will
likely argue that they do not have a duty to accommodate any transient
limitations on major life activities that stem from corrective treatments or
devices.
The EEOC has set forth three factors that should be considered in
determining what constitutes a substantial limitation of a major life activity:
84. Id. at 912. District courts have similarly found that the side effects of chemotherapy were
not a disabling treatment. See, e.g., Schwertfager v. City of Boynton Beach. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347
(S.D. Fla. 1999); Madjlessi v. Macy's West, 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
85. Some courts, however, were disinclined to accord deference to EEOC regulations even
prior to Sutton. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 73, at 102, 133-37; Locke, supra note 30, at 109.
86. 117 F.3d 800(5th Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 806. The EEOC regulations under Title I of the ADA state that in order to be
considered substantially impaired in the major life activity of "working" an individual must be
unable to perform an entire class of jobs, not just a particular position. See 29 C.F.I § 1630.20)
(1998).
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(1) " [t]he nature and the severity of the impairment"; (2) "the duration...
of the impairment"; and (3) the "long-term impact" of the impairment.88
The EEOC's technical assistance manual for the ADA further states that
temporary, non-chronic impairments that do not last for a long time and
have little or no long-term impact usually are not disabilities.89 Some courts
have interpreted this language to limit the classification of side effects as
disabilities under the ADA, especially when those side effects may not be
permanent (such as with a therapy of limited duration) or may lessen or
stabilize with time (as is the case with many types of side effects). For
example, in Wheelock v. Philip Morris,9° a federal district court in
Louisiana found that an individual who experienced drowsiness caused by
the drug Klonopin could not appropriately be termed an individual with a
disability. Because the plaintiff had discontinued use of the drug at the time
of trial and the drowsiness had only been a problem during the time period
while the plaintiff was taking the drug, the court determined that the
impairment lacked the duration and long-term impact required for
classification as a disability.9 Moreover, the court in Wheelock went on to
state that though the plaintiff had not complained of side effects resulting
from the drug (Serzone) that he was taking at the time of trial, any such side
effects would also be temporary, given that the underlying condition that
these drugs were being used to treat (anger and depression) was, in the
court's view, a transitory condition for the plaintiff.92 Similarly, in Taylor v.
Dover Elevator Systems,93 a federal district court in Mississippi determined
that the emotional impairments that the plaintiff might have suffered as a
side effect of the epilepsy drug Felbatol did not constitute a disability
within the meaning of the ADA. Because the plaintiff admitted that the
emotional impairments induced by the drug had affected him "on a very
temporary basis" without any long-term disabling effect, the court ruled
that, as per the EEOC regulations, the temporary side effects of the drugs
did not substantially limit the plaintiff's ability to engage in any major life
activity.'
The "duration" requirement has also prevented cancer patients from
successfully bringing ADA claims against their employers based on the
impairments resulting from cancer treatments. For example, in
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
89. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT § 2.2(a)(iii) (1992).
90. Civ. A. No. 95-0999, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1292 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1997).
91. See id. at *19.
92. See id. at *20.
93. 917 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
94. Id. at 460-61.
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Schwertfager v. City of Boynton Beach,95 the plaintiff took a leave of
absence from work to have reconstructive surgery performed after a
mastectomy. After the surgery, the plaintiff experienced significant
discomfort and was unable to change her bandages without daily trips to the
hospital for assistance." According to the plaintiff, the effects of the
surgery also impaired her ability to care for, dress, and cook for herself.'
During the period immediately following her surgery, her work
performance suffered and she was offered a demotion by her employer. She
refused the offer and filed suit.98 The court granted summary judgment to
the defendant, ruling that Schwertfager was not properly classified as an
individual with a disability because she did not claim to suffer any physical
limitations beyond the five-month period immediately following her
reconstructive surgery.99
Interpreting the EEOC regulations to prohibit the classification of any
nonpermanent side effect of a corrective measure as a disability severely
limits the scope of the disabling corrections corollary to the correctable
disabilities rule. Many individuals who can mitigate otherwise permanently
disabling conditions with medications or other corrective measures endure
periods of adjustment while introducing new treatments or altering existing
treatment regimens. The side effects of drug treatments and other therapies
are frequently of uncertain duration."° Many of these effects decrease with
time as an individual's body adjusts or as an individual's physician adjusts
the dosage of the medication to minimize side effects and drug
interactions."' In addition, it often takes significant time to find the correct
combination of medicines to treat an individual's condition most
effectively."° Individuals who are willing to tolerate severe side effects and
lengthy (though not necessarily permanent) periods of adjustment to new
therapies in order to treat an underlying condition that might otherwise
prevent them from participating in the workplace should not be discouraged
from such participation by the threat of discrimination. Such an outcome is
inconsistent with both the pro-mitigation and pro-work policy goals of the
95. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
96. See id at 1352.
97. See id. at 1359.
98. See id. at 1352.
99. See id. at 1360.
100. See, e.g., MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 42 (Robert Berkow et al. eds.,
1997) (explaining that adverse drug reactions are common and vary in both duration and severity).
101. See, e.g., The Epilepsy Foundation, Medicines for Epilepsy: Side Effects (visited Sept.
12, 1999) <http.//www.efa.org/education/meds/other.html> (explaining that individuals with
epilepsy experience side effects of anti-seizure medicines more frequently with initial use of a
drug or with major dosage changes).
102. See, e.g., The Epilepsy Foundation, Medicines for Epilepsy: The Right Medicine (visited
Sept. 12, 1999) <http://www.efa.org/education/meds/right.html> (explaining that each person
experiences individualized reactions to drug treatments and that finding an appropriate
combination of medicines and dosages can be a lengthy process).
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ADA. Moreover, keeping such individuals out of the courtroom does not
address the Supreme Court's concern, expressed in the correctable
disabilities cases, for limiting specious ADA claims by individuals with
easily corrected impairments.
It is important to note that the "duration" and "long-term impact"
requirements for establishing a disability are grounded only in the EEOC's
regulations and have no foundation in the statutory language or the
legislative history of the Act." 3 The other federal agencies authorized to
interpret the ADA (including the Department of Justice and the Department
of Transportation) have strongly rejected the exclusion of temporary
impairments from the ADA's protections.' In addition, there is no
consensus among federal courts as to the appropriateness of classifying a
temporary condition as a disability." 5 Indeed, as one of the drafters of the
ADA has opined,
[N]one of the EEOC's gloss on temporary impairments has any
basis in regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act, nor in the
legislative history of the ADA .... Nowhere does the legislative
history suggest that an otherwise substantially limiting condition
should not be considered so because it does not last long enough."
This commentator has also suggested that the EEOC's view that "a
condition may not qualify as a disability because it is only temporary or
of insufficient duration can be traced to court decisions that have
weaknesses and deficiencies limiting their value as convincing legal
precedent."' 0 7 The EEOC itself has frequently made "ameliorative
comments and concessions" regarding its position to exclude short-term
impairments from the definition of disability.0 8 Thus, while the EEOC's
regulations interpreting Title I of the ADA are generally entitled to great
deference,"° greater scrutiny may be appropriate when reviewing the
agency's position on short-term impairments.
Moreover, there is some indication in the Sutton opinion itself that
the disabling corrections corollary should be read in a manner that does
not necessarily exclude corrections whose disabling effects are not
permanent. In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor cites three examples
103. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409,475-76 (1997).
104. See id. at 480.
105. See, e.g., Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1999).
106. Burgdorf, supra note 103, at 479.
107. Id. at 469.
108. Id. at 482. See also id. at 479-81.
109. See, e.g., Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health, 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir.
1999).
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of potentially disabling corrective measures: antipsychotic drugs, drug
treatments used for Parkinson's disease, and anti-epileptic drugs. Studies of
some of the most frequently utilized examples of each of these types of
drugs, however, reveal that many of the most severe side effects decline
with time or as medication levels are adjusted and drug interactions are
minimized." For example, Loxitane is an antipsychotic whose side
effects frequently include neuromuscular reactions such as tremors,
rigidity, excessive salivation, and akathisia (motor restlessness) and other
Parkinsonian symptoms."' These effects most frequently occur during the
initial days of treatment and can generally be controlled in the long term
with a gradual reduction in the initial dosage of Loxitane or administration
of anti-Parkinsonian drugs." 2 Thus, though these side effects are of limited
duration and likely have no significant long-term impact, there is some
indication that the majority in Sutton felt that such effects should be
considered in determining whether an individual undergoing such a mental
health treatment was entitled to the protections of the ADA.
C. Employers' Attempts To Second-Guess Medical Decisions
In addition to demanding strict adherence to both the statutory and
regulatory requirements defining "individual with a disability," courts
seem inclined (in certain circumstances) to permit employers to question
the appropriateness of employees' treatment decisions when these decisions
involve a disabling correction. These courts, however, have heretofore
appeared unconcerned with the potentially dangerous implications of this
judicial tendency. If employers are permitted to challenge the
appropriateness of an employee's decision to utilize a disabling correction,
then employees will be forced to seek approval from their employers before
making important medical decisions. Ultimately, such employees may be
forced to allow their employers to dictate the outcome of treatment
decisions.
110. Most antipsychotic drugs, including Levora, Navane, or Clorazil. have severe side
effects that can impair both mental and physical abilities and potentially cause serious health risks.
However, some of the most severe side effects can diminish or disappear after the initial stages of
treatment See PHYsICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2004-08. 2396-98, 3220-25 (53d ed. 1999). Anti-
Parkinsonian drugs such as Artane, Tasmar, and Requip have side effects ranging from moderate
to severe, many of which become less pronounced with continued use, reduction in dosage, or
minimization of drug interactions. See id. at 1515-16, 2709-13, 3087-92. Similarly. anti-epileptic
drugs such as Mysoline, Klonopin, and Felbatol also have moderate-to-severe side effects that can
diminish with time. See id. at 614,2688-90, 3195-99.
111. See id at 3224-25.
112. See id.
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1. The Implicit "Necessary and Appropriate" Requirement
A number of pre-Sutton cases indicate a desire by employers to second-
guess employees' treatment decisions when the side effects of those
treatments lead plaintiffs to invoke the protections of the ADA. One pre-
Sutton case indicates a willingness to allow employers to substitute their
judgments for those of plaintiffs when plaintiffs choose medical procedures
to treat conditions that do not rise to the level of disabilities under the
ADA. In Christian v. St. Anthony Medical Center,"3 the plaintiff had an
excessive amount of cholesterol in her blood, a condition known as
hypercholesterolemia. Though the condition was not itself disabling, the
plaintiff alleged that she was fired because "the defendant anticipated that
she would undergo a disabling treatment-namely pheresis (or aphereisis),
in which the blood is drained from the patient's body, cleansed of its
cholesterol, and put back into the patient." 114 Such treatments would have
continued throughout the plaintiffs life and would have required the
plaintiff to miss a day or two of work each month. The Seventh Circuit
readily agreed that a disabling treatment could be considered a disability
under the ADA, even if the underlying condition being addressed did not
meet the criteria for a disability." 5 Moreover, the court agreed that if
Christian was fired because her employer anticipated that she would have to
take time off work to engage in such a disabling treatment, that would also
constitute a prima facie case under the ADA."16 However, the court raised a
caveat that a disabling treatment could "trigger a duty of accommodation"
only if it was "truly necessary, and not merely an attractive option."" 7 The
court suggested that because Christian's doctor was currently prescribing a
regimen of drugs and exercise to treat her condition, the pheresis was
merely "optional," not a required treatment that would invoke the ADA's
protections. This discussion was dictum, however, as the judgment for the
defendant ultimately rested upon the court's conclusion that the plaintiff's
dismissal was not related in any way to her condition." 8
At least one federal district court has also addressed, albeit in a
somewhat oblique fashion, an employer's contention that a disabling
correction must be "necessary" or "appropriate." In Berk v. Bates
Advertising USA," 9 plaintiff Claudia Berk was undergoing treatment for
breast cancer. At the time of her diagnosis, she had been informed that "her
particular type of breast cancer would put her life at risk if she became
113. 117 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997).




118. Id. at 1052-53.
119. 25 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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pregnant; and that a hysterectomy (surgical removal of the uterus) and
bilateral oophorectomy (surgical removal of both ovaries) were advisable
precautions against a spread or recurrence of cancer." ' The plaintiff
"reluctantly acted" upon this advice shortly after her employment with
Bates was terminated.'21 A New York district court concluded that
during the period between Berk's return to work at Bates after her
cancer surgery and Bates' subsequent termination of her
employment, Berk suffered from a physical impairment (cancer and
its accompanying possibility of recurrence) which substantially
limited the major life activity of reproduction in two ways: the
cancer made pregnancy unduly risky for Berk; and the cancer also
rendered advisable operations which would destroy any chance of
reproduction.'"
Summary judgment for the defendant was denied because the plaintiff was
appropriately classified as an individual with a disability within the
meaning of the ADA.
Since the Supreme Court had only recently clarified that reproduction
should be considered a major life activity under the ADA, however, the
defendant asked the court to allow it to obtain and to present medical
evidence challenging the soundness of the medical advice that Berk had
received from her treating physician.'24 The court declined the request,
finding that additional medical testimony would be irrelevant because a
medical text relied upon by the defendant stated that delaying or avoiding
pregnancy after breast cancer was medically appropriate.'"
Both of these opinions allow for the possibility that an employer might
be able to second-guess an employee's treatment decisions under certain
circumstances. Though the Seventh Circuit's holding in Christian did not
directly address the disabling corrections question, the tone of the terse
opinion suggests that the court would have been sympathetic to an
employer's refusal to accommodate a disabling correction if the employer
had demonstrated that the treatment was somehow "unnecessary" or
"inappropriate." The Berk court did directly address a disabling correction
to an ADA disability, and it was not especially sympathetic to the
employer's attempt to second-guess the employee's treating physician. The
court, however, was strongly influenced by its finding that there was
"consensus" in the medical community that the plaintiff's elected treatment
120. Id. at 268.
121. Id.
122. 1l at 268-69.
123. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998).
124. See Berk, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
125. See id. at 269-70.
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was medically appropriate. Had the treatment been experimental or not
widely accepted in the medical community, it is unclear whether the court
would have permitted the defendant to second-guess the plaintiff's choice.
2. Employer Pre-Approval of Treatment Decisions
Judicial willingness to allow employers to second-guess employee
treatment decisions may ultimately permit employers to impose their own
views about medically appropriate treatments upon the personal medical
decisions of any employee with a disability. If courts freely permit after-
the-fact employer challenges to an employee's choices concerning
disability-limiting corrections, a cautious employee will likely feel obliged
to consult with his or her employer prior to undergoing corrective surgeries
or other potentially disabling therapies. Such consultations would be needed
not only to inform the employer of the chosen treatment, but also to inquire
into the employer's perceptions concerning the medical necessity or
appropriateness of the treatment and the employer's willingness to
accommodate any potential side effects. In effect, employees may feel
compelled to seek pre-approval from their employers before attempting to
correct a health problem. The employer would thus become a third
participant, along with the employee and his or her physician, in the process
of deciding the appropriate course of treatment for the employee's
underlying condition. In this situation, the employer could potentially
dictate the employee's course of medical treatment, under pain of
termination.
The pre-Sutton district-court opinion in Pangalos v. Prudential
Insurance Co."26 demonstrates that this concern is by no means
hypothetical. In that case, the plaintiff was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis,
a condition that caused him to suffer from uncontrollable diarrhea, bloody
stools, and painful hemorrhoids. The only permanent "cure" for his
condition was to undergo a colostomy-the surgical creation of an opening
between the colon and the abdominal wall that allows for fecal elimination.
This treatment can itself be considered disabling.'27 The plaintiff, a
traveling salesman, elected not to undergo this "drastic alternative" to treat
126. No. 96-0167, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996).
127. The side effects of this procedure can include (but are not limited to) swelling and
soreness for a period of four to six weeks or more; frequently recurring skin infection, erosion,
and ulceration; permanently increased incidence of drug absorption problems; and temporary or
long-lasting depression. Moreover, all patients who undergo this surgery must use a rather
complicated procedure to evacuate stool (once or twice daily) and many must irrigate the
colostomy for bowel control on a daily basis. See, e.g., ADULT NURSING IN HOSPITAL AND
COMMUNITY SETTINGS 1419-27 (Lenette Owens Burrell ed., 1992); FUNDAMENTALS OF
NURSING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NURSING CARE 930-32 (Carol Taylor et al. eds., 2d cd.
1993); JUNE M. THOMPSON ET AL., MOSBY'S CLINICAL NURSING 785-89 (4th ed. 1997).
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his condition,'" and instead elected the less intrusive, but less effective,
"treatment" of paying careful attention to his diet and cleaning up
accidents resulting from lack of ready access to toilet facilities. The plaintiff
requested that his employer provide him with a van or similar vehicle
equipped with a portable bathroom (that would have, in the plaintiff's view,
enabled him to perform his job) or reassign him to a job that did not involve
travel. As the plaintiff admitted that the cost of the vehicle would have been
exceedingly high ($40,000 to $100,000), he indicated a preference for
reassignment. Though the defendant suggested a number of alternative
accommodations, the parties were unable to find a mutually agreeable
accommodation prior to litigation.'"
The Pennsylvania district court initially questioned whether the plaintiff
could qualify as an individual with a disability, given that he had rejected a
surgical correction for his condition.' Though the court later recognized
that only the plaintiff would be entitled to make a decision as to the
reasonableness of rejecting the treatment,13' the court came to the
conclusion that the plaintiff was mistaken in believing that a vehicle
equipped with a bathroom facility would have permitted him to perform
effectively the requirements of his current position..1 32 The court held that
"[e]ither the plaintiff is not disabled, because the disabling condition...
could readily be remedied surgically, or plaintiff is not qualified to perform
the essential duties of his position with the defendant." ,33 The Panaglos
decision can thus be read to support the conclusion that an employer,
consistently with the ADA, may refuse to agree to an expensive
accommodation for an employee if that employee can correct his or her
condition with a technology or procedure that would be less expensive for
the employer to accommodate (regardless of the disabling effects of that
treatment on the employee). If this is true, then the employer, without fear
of liability under the ADA, may force an employee with a disability to
choose between a highly intrusive or even disabling medical procedure and
his or her job.
Other instances where employers have attempted to dictate medical
therapies abound. Dismissals for failure to undergo "adequate" alcohol
abuse therapy, for instance, are exceedingly common.'" Even outside the
128. Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist- LEXIS 15749, at *3.
129. See id. at *5.
130. See id. at *6.
131. See id. at *7.
132. See id. at *8.
133. Id. Surprisingly, the court did not inquire into any possible disabling effects of the
colostomy. The court further concluded that either there was no feasible accommodation for the
plaintiff if he continued to refuse to have a colostomy or that the accommodations offered by the
defendant were as a matter of law reasonable. See id.
134. See, e.g., Tim Edwards, Constitutional Limits on an Employer's Right To Dictate the
Terns of an Addict's Recovery Under the ADA: Some Sobering Concerns. 44 WAYNE L REV.
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perhaps distinguishable context of substance-abuse treatments,135 employers
seem quite willing to dictate or otherwise to manage employee treatment
decisions.136 Most lower courts have thus far been unreceptive to such
attempts. As future plaintiffs increasingly focus judicial attention on
disabling corrections, this commendable skepticism should continue to
characterize judicial reaction to such claims.
3. The Dangers of Second-Guessing
The prospect that employer (or judicial) preferences will play
a significant role in private health care decisionmaking is unsettling
for several reasons. Initially, allowing employers to refuse to
accommodate plaintiffs who select medical interventions later deemed
to be "unnecessary" or "inappropriate" is inconsistent with the broad
conceptualization of a disabling correction that is advocated in this Note.
Moreover, as long as an employer feels confident in its ability to elicit
expert testimony that a disabling correction was not necessary or
appropriate, it can discriminate against employees with disabilities with
impunity. Such an approach undermines the autonomy of individuals with
disabilities and prevents individuals who have taken significant steps to
mitigate serious health conditions from participating in the economy.
Permitting employers to second-guess employees' medical decisions
necessarily entails a judicial role in second-guessing these decisions
as well. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned lower courts
against introducing judicial discretion into medical and scientific
decisionmaking.137 Neither employers nor courts are especially well-
1679, 1703-06 (1999) (detailing the widespread judicial acceptance of "firm choice"
requirements, wherein employers require alcoholic employees to attend a recommended treatment
program or face discipline or dismissal).
135. See id. at 1697-706 (explaining the unique status of alcoholics under the ADA and the
limited nature of the protections that many alcoholics receive under the Act).
136. For example, in Lent v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 97 Civ. 9413, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20371 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1998), the plaintiffs employer readily admitted that the
plaintiff was terminated because his supervisors perceived him to have "poor judgment" about
treating his epilepsy and because the employer (incorrectly) believed that he had a "cavalier"
attitude about taking his anti-seizure medication. Id. at *8. Similarly, in Finical v. Collection
Unlimited, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Ariz. 1999), the defendant requested that summary judgment
be granted on the grounds that the plaintiff was not an individual with a disability within the
meaning of the ADA. Though the plaintiff had a hearing impairment that caused her to "miss"
about 37% of normal speech, see id. at 1041, her employer argued that she was not an individual
with a disability because, in the employer's view, she should have been using a hearing aid to
mitigate the effects of her condition, see id. at 1037. Though the defendants in both of these cases
were denied summary judgment, these cases evidence a willingness on the part of employers to
attempt to question and interfere with their employees' (and their employees' physicians')
medical judgments about how most appropriately to treat impairments.
137. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974) ("When Congress
undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options
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qualified to determine whether elective medical treatments are either
"necessary" or "appropriate."' 38 It makes little sense to burden the courts
with highly technical factual disputes (frequently turning on expensive and
time-consuming expert testimony) when the employee already has every
incentive to avoid the expense and risk of medical interventions that are
truly unnecessary or inappropriate.
Beyond the burden on the courts that such "necessity challenges" to
disabling treatments would entail, the increased employer involvement in
private medical decisionmaking that results from these challenges also
presents a number of significant problems. Such involvement runs counter
to the ADA's explicit policy goal of enhancing the independence and
autonomy of individuals with disabilities.'39 A judicial approach to
correctable disabilities that effectively allows employers to dictate the
outcome of medical decisions necessarily reduces the range of treatment
options (and the range of employment options) available to the individuals
with disabilities. Moreover, in the context of controversial or experimental
corrections, extensive employer involvement in treatment decisions could
adversely affect an employee's health. For example, an individual who
had a choice between a riskier treatment (perhaps a surgical treatment)
that, if effective, would have fewer side effects requiring workplace
accommodation, and a less risky treatment (perhaps a medical, drug-based
treatment) with more side effects requiring workplace accommodation
might effectively be forced to choose a treatment option that endangered his
or her health more in order to endanger his or her job less. Finally,
constitutional privacy and liberty interests may be implicated when a
governmental employer attempts to use the terms and conditions of
employment to interfere with an individual's autonomy in medical
decisionmaking.'"
must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. even assuming,
arguendo, that judges with more direct exposure to the problem might make wiser choices.-).
138. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon. J., concurring)
(" [Slubstantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is
dangerously unreliable .... ); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due
Process, 107 YALE LJ. 1535, 1539 (1998) ("[Nionexpert judges' and juries' lack of
understanding of the cognitive aims and methods of science and their reliance on such indicia of
expertise as credentials, reputation, and demeanor to choose between competing scientific experts
thus yield only episternically arbitrary judgments.").
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994).
140. Most courts, however, have not considered such interests controlling, at least when
considering whether an employee has the right to refuse employer-mandated treatment for
alcoholism. In such instances, employees have been more successful contesting the
constitutionality of compelled treatments under state constitutions. See Edwards, supra note 134,
at 1724-30.
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III. REGULATORY REFORM
As described above, the provisions of the EEOC's Title I regulations
emphasizing the duration and long-term impact of an impairment have
facilitated the prevailing judicial reluctance to accept corrective measures
as disabilities. Though the previously quoted regulations specify that
"duration" and "long-term impact" are two of the three factors involved in
a determination of disability, the first and undoubtedly most important
factor is the nature and severity of the impairment. Because the courts
frequently read the regulations to preclude the classification of temporary
conditions as disabilities, 4 ' an amendment to those regulations could
encourage courts to give the disabling corrections corollary the expansive
scope that the statute and the Supreme Court's Sutton opinion necessitate.
The EEOC's Title I regulations should include a caveat indicating that
the last two factors in the substantial impairment test (duration and long-
term impact) should be less determinative when the impairment in question
is a side effect of an attempt to mitigate another underlying condition. For
example, a new subsection (iv) could be added to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2)
reading as follows: "When the impairment in question results from the side
effects of a treatment or corrective measure, consideration of the duration
and long-term impact of the impairment should not necessarily preclude the
classification of such impairments as disabilities."
In essence, the severity factor would be permitted to trump the duration
and long-term impact requirements when the impairment under
consideration is the side effect of an attempt to remedy an underlying
condition. This change would be consistent with the goals of the ADA,
encouraging individuals to mitigate the effects of underlying conditions in
order to participate in the economy. Moreover, such regulatory language
would allow for an adequately broad interpretation of the disabling
corrections corollary that would appropriately target the narrowing effects
of the correctable disabilities decisions.
There is some indication that the EEOC would favor such a change.
Despite its regulatory language, the agency has never maintained that
permanency should be a per se requirement for establishing a disability
under the ADA. 4 2 Moreover, the EEOC's amicus curiae brief in Sutton
reveals the agency's preference for a broad construction of the ADA's
applicability.' 43 Perhaps most significantly, in her public comments
following the release of the Sutton opinion, EEOC chairwoman Ida Castro
indicated that Sutton's reference to disabling corrections was in accord with
141. See, e.g., Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 1997) (arguing that
"permanency ... is the touchstone of a substantially limiting impairment").
142. See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 103, at 479.
143. See EEOC amicus brief, supra note 42, at 7-9.
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the Commission's position that "people who use mitigating measures may
still be substantially limited in major life activities and thus may enjoy the
protection of the ADA." '44
The efficacy of a strategy that focuses on changes to the definitional
portions of the EEOC regulations may be somewhat doubtful in light of the
language in Sutton questioning the deference due those regulations t45 and
the apparent "judicial uprising" against the EEOC's ADA regulations.14 In
the correctable disabilities cases, however, the Supreme Court declined to
rule on the degree of deference owed to the EEOC's interpretation of the
term "disability."' 47 The Court disregarded the interpretive guideline
requiring that an impairment be considered in an uncorrected state without
regard to mitigating measures because the Court concluded that this
guideline conflicted with the plain language of the statute. The few courts
that have had the opportunity to examine the continued validity of the
EEOC's other definitional regulations after Sutton have continued to find
these regulations instructive.'"
The regulatory change proposed here is consistent with the plain
language of the ADA; it would merely deemphasize two of three previously
articulated factors in the regulatory definition of a "substantial limitation"
when the impairment in question is a disabling correction. In the absence of
direct statutory conflict, there are strong arguments in favor of continued
deference to the EEOC's regulations. 49 Moreover, the Sutton majority's
reference to the regulatory definition of "substantially limits" in explaining
144. EEOC Chairwoman Comments on ADA Rulings by Supreme Court During Speech to
Plaintiffs Bar in New Orleans (last modified July 1. 1999) <http-.//www.ecoc.gov/pressfl-l-
99.html>.
145. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. CL 2139, 2145-47 (1999).
146. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 73, at 102, 135-36; Locke, supra note 30. at 113-15.
147. See Sutton, 119 S. CL at 2145-46.
148. Most such courts have noted the language in the Sutton opinion addressing the need for
deference to the EEOC's regulations, but this language has been interpreted in highly divergent
fashions. While one Arizona district court said that the Court in Sutton "assumed. without
deciding," that the regulations were reasonable, Finical v. Collections Unlimited. 65 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1042 (D. Ariz. 1999), the Fifth Circuit characterized the Sutton language as "cast[ing] a
shadow of doubt over the validity and authority of the EEOC's regulations," EEOC v. R.J.
Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654 n.5 (5th Cir. 1999) (declining to address the question of the
continued applicability of the EEOC regulations). Regardless of each particular court's " slant" on
the Sutton language, most post-Sutton opinions considering the need for deference to the EEOC's
regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA have continued to defer
to the EEOC's regulations on the grounds that such deference is "the law of the circuit" until and
unless the Supreme Court issues a more definite statement indicating otherwise. See, e.g., Muller
v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999); Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1042; Tatum v.
Hospital of the Univ. of Pa., No. 98-6198, 1999 U.S. Dist- LEXIS 10174. at *10-11 (ED. Pa. June
24, 1999); cf. Muszak v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 63 F. Supp. 2d 292. 299 OV.D.N.Y. 1999) (using
the EEOC's three-factor test to determine what constitutes a substantial limitation on a major life
activity post-Sutton). Similarly, there is some indication that practitioners plan to continue to rely
on EEOC guidelines. See, e.g., Panel Discusses Impact of Supreme Court Decisions, DISABILUTY
COMPLIANCEBULL. (LRP Publications, Alexandria. VA). Aug. 30, 1999.
149. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 73, at 134-37.
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why the plaintiffs did not meet the "regarded as" prong of the statutory
definition of disability provides further evidence of the continued
persuasive effect of the EEOC's regulations. 5 '
The EEOC's amended Title I regulations should discourage the courts
from placing undue emphasis on the "duration" and "long-term impact"
factors when evaluating whether a corrective measure substantially limits a
major life activity. Such a regulatory change would clearly indicate to
employers and the courts that the agency supports a generous interpretation
of the Sutton decision that will continue to protect those individuals who
have gone to great lengths to mitigate disabling impairments and who are
willing to endure the side effects of disabling corrections in their attempt to
remain self-sufficient participants in the national economy.
IV. A REVISED JUDICIAL APPROACH
If the disabling corrections corollary is to play an effective role in
reconciling the ADA's promise of autonomy and opportunity for
individuals with disabilities with the Supreme Court's concern for limiting
frivolous litigation, the courts must adopt both a broad conceptualization of
disabling corrections and an appropriately deferential approach toward
reviewing employees' choices of corrective treatments or technologies.
Judicial deference is not something that can easily be dictated by a
regulation or even a statute. It is an attitude that reflects sensitivity to the
role that Congress has assigned to the courts as enforcers of the ADA and
an appreciation for the policies that Congress meant for the statute to
effectuate.
A. A Broad View of Disabling Corrections
Initially, in marked contrast to their pre-Sutton approach (in which
courts seemed disinclined to accept even severe side effects of corrective
measures as disabilities), post-Sutton courts should be especially hesitant to
conclude that the significant side effects of a treatment are not appropriately
considered disabling. Critical to this generous judicial interpretation of the
disabling corrections corollary is the need to view the effects of treatments
holistically.
In light of the Sutton decision, courts called upon to determine whether
an individual meets the ADA definition of disability will no longer evaluate
the individual's underlying condition. Instead, these courts will scrutinize
the degree of success with which the individual is mitigating his or her
underlying impairment. With this change will come an inevitable increase
150. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
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in the number of claims of disability that are based on the side effects of
corrective measures. In evaluating such side effects, it is important to
recognize that treatments such as drug therapies often produce multiple side
effects that can vary according to the dosage of the drug and the stage of the
treatment.151 These multiple side effects can have synergistic effects,
especially when an individual is taking many types of medication
simultaneously. For example, the nausea induced by one medicine can
exacerbate the weakness and fatigue caused by another. Similarly, an
individual who experiences mild dizziness, mild nausea, moderate tremors,
and mild depression as side effects of a drug might experience a significant
impairment that results not from any individual side effect, but instead from
the debilitating impact of this combination of otherwise minor impairments.
An appropriately broad reading of Sutton's "disabling corrections"
language requires courts to acknowledge the cumulative impact of
numerous side effects on an individual's ability to engage in major life
activities. Indeed, for a patient who uses multiple drug therapies, the
cumulative effect of many independently minor side effects can be far more
debilitating than the severity of the individual effects might indicate. Courts
should readily acknowledge that the "whole" side effect of a drug therapy
program can often be greater than the sum of its parts. Adopting such a
holistic approach when evaluating the impact of multiple minor
impairments would not be a novel judicial strategy. A number of federal
courts have already acknowledged the validity of such an approach in the
context of both ADA and Social Security disability claims." - For example,
in Reichenbach v. Heckler,'53 a Social Security disability case, the Fourth
Circuit overruled an administrative law judge's finding that an individual
with Reiter's syndrome was not entitled to Social Security disability
benefits. Though Reichenbach's evaluating physician maintained that the
symptoms that he was experiencing as a result of his underlying condition
were not sufficient to qualify him for disability benefits, Reichenbach was
also experiencing psychological problems that were independent of the
effects of the Reiter's syndrome." 4 The Fourth Circuit chastised the
administrative law judge for failing to analyze the cumulative, or
synergistic, effect of the claimant's various impairments, and ruled that an
151. See supra Section II.B.
152. See, e.g., Hines v. Bowen, 872 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (finding. in the
Social Security disability context, that the synergistic effect of several minor conditions may
result in major disability); cf. United States v. Henley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.C. 1998)
(evaluating the mental health of a prisoner due for release). In Henley. the court evaluated " not
only the severity of Respondent's disorders, but the interaction of the disorders and their
combined effect on Respondent." Id. at 507. The court found that the "synergistic effect of the
two disorders results in a substantial impairment of Respondent's ability to function in society and
to control his behavior." Id.
153. 808 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1985).
154. Seeid. at310.
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effective consideration of "the residual functional capacity of the
individual... requires a combined analysis of all physical and mental
impairments." "'
Such analysis is applicable in the context of ADA claims as well. For
example, in Creswell v. Deere,56 a Texas district court declined to grant
summary judgment on the defendant employer's claim that a former
employee was not an individual with a disability within the meaning of the
ADA. Though the employer argued that neither the effects of the plaintiff's
diabetes nor the effects of the plaintiff's asthma were severe enough to limit
substantially a major life activity, the court opined that "[a]ll of the cases
cited by Defendant... only consider one of the two conditions (diabetes or
asthma), not the effect of both of these ailments (diabetes and asthma) on
major life activities." '57 The court agreed with the plaintiff that "the better
approach in this case is to view the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's
conditions on her major life activities." 158 The need for courts to engage in
such synergistic evaluations is even more pressing when these courts are
considering the impact of potentially disabling correc tions like drug
therapies, which tend to have a number of significant (but not necessarily
severe) side effects. Moreover, this permissive view of disabling
corrections is more consistent with both the pro-work policies underlying
the ADA and the pro-mitigation goals of the Sutton majority than an
approach that would deny the ADA's protections to those who endure
debilitating side effects in order to mitigate an even more restrictive
underlying condition.
B. Judicial Deference to Employee Decisions
The suggestion in Sutton that disabling corrections are still actionable
under the ADA will no doubt encourage employers to second-guess the
choices that employees make to mitigate disabling conditions. There is
some indication in the pre-Sutton cases of a judicial willingness to allow
employers to inquire into both the "necessity" and "acceptability" of
disabling medical treatments. Requiring an ADA plaintiff to justify the
necessity or appropriateness of a decision to mitigate the effects of a health
problem is inconsistent with a broad application of Sutton's "disabling
corrections" language.
The courts should be especially wary of the very real potential that an
unduly narrow application of the disabling corrections corollary will
involve employers and the judiciary in the technically complex and highly
155. Id. at 312.
156. No. 3:96-CV-1392-P, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22890 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 1997).
157. Id. at *24 (emphasis omitted).
158. Id.
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personal business of evaluating the appropriateness of medical
interventions. Such second-guessing also encourages employers and the
courts to inquire into what an individual's limitations might be under a
hypothetical alternate treatment program. The Sutton majority specifically
argued against the use of such hypothetical inquiries."9 Most alarmingly,
judicial willingness to entertain employers' attempts to second-guess
employees' medical choices may encourage employers to force employees
to select alternative treatments that are less expensive to accommodate but
more dangerous or disruptive to the plaintiff.
To reduce the potential for such second-guessing, the courts should
establish a strong presumption in favor of an individual's informed choice
of corrective treatments in deciding whether he or she is an individual with
a disability within the meaning of the ADA.260 Such a presumption would
preserve scarce judicial resources by discouraging questionable employer
strategies of the sort employed by the defendant in Berk v. Bates
Advertising USA, 161 aimed at creating medical controversies where none
exists in order to challenge the appropriateness of the advice of the
plaintiff's treating physician. A strong judicial presumption in favor of an
individual employee's informed medical judgement would also minimize
the risk of undesirable employer influence over private health care
decisions. Finally, such a presumption would go a long way toward
ensuring the vitality of the disabling corrections corollary to the correctable
disability rule.
Precedent exists for erecting a presumption in favor of the judgment of
an individual and that individual's treating physician in other fields of
health law. For example, in administering the Early and Periodic Screening,
Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Program (a program that provides
medically necessary health care services to Medicaid-eligible children
under age twenty-one),' 62 state Medicaid agencies must give a strong
presumption of deference to the treating physician's assessment of medical
necessity."6a State agencies, of course, may rebut the presumption, although
159. See Sunon, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
160. Clearly, this presumption of deference would also apply when the medical choice that an
employer is second-guessing is a decision to refuse treatment for an underlying condition rather
than a choice to utilize a disabling correction. Indeed, these situations are of an essentially similar
nature, given that the former decision (to refuse treatment) is generally made in order to avoid
disabling side effects. The fundamental choice at issue (whether or not to utilize a disabling
correction) is the same. The potential dangers of permitting courts or employers to question the
acceptability of the decision are the same in both contexts, and the need for a presumption of
deference is as strong. The only exception to this premise might be the decision to refuse
substance-abuse treatment, where the applicable law is somewhat unique. See supra note 135.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 119-125.
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (1994).
163. As the Eight Circuit held in Pinneke %'. Preisser. 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980), "The
decision of whether or not certain treatment or a particular type of surgery is 'medically
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the courts have not articulated definitive rebuttal criteria. The Fifth Circuit
adopted a typical test in Ruch v. Parham,"6 when it suggested that a state
could overrule a treating physician's judgment regarding the medical
necessity of a particular procedure or treatment, based on reasonable
standards, when the procedure in question was "experimental" or did not
constitute a "medically appropriate" treatment.' 65
Because incentives in the ADA and Medicaid contexts are notably
dissimilar, different rebuttal criteria are required. States administering the
EPSDT program are legitimately concerned that individuals may attempt to
"game the system" or "doctor-shop" to secure assistance for inessential
but nonetheless desirable treatments. This incentive structure may justify
less deference to physician-assisted medical choices in an EPSDT case than
is warranted in a disabling corrections case, where employees have less
incentive to doctor-shop for a physician willing to recommend a treatment
option that is unnecessarily disabling in order to receive accommodations in
the workplace.
It is important to emphasize that courts should not allow employers to
rebut informed employee choices of corrective procedures or technologies
on the grounds that the employee's choice posed too great a risk to the
employee's own physical or mental well-being. Although the potential for
moral hazard is always present in social interactions in which costs can be
shifted from one person to another, it is highly unlikely that an employee
would undergo a risky treatment or corrective technique solely to take
advantage of his or her employer's obligation to accommodate under the
ADA.
This is not to say that the presumption in favor of an individual's
informed treatment decisions that is advocated here should be irrebuttable.
The potential problem being targeted in this instance is not the unnecessary
utilization of a state's medical resources (as in the EPSDT example), but
instead the relatively rare instance of the individual who has a truly
"voluntary disability," either because the individual has refused treatment
for the condition or-less likely-because the individual has elected an
unnecessarily disabling treatment option."6 Thus any limits on the
necessary' rests with the individual recipient's physician and not with clerical personnel or
government officials." Id. at 550.
164. 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
165. See id. at 1152.
166. Disabling corrections may be a subset of a broader class of what Professor Lisa Key of
the University of Missouri-Columbia refers to as "voluntary disabilities." Professor Key suggests
that the appropriate way for courts to treat a voluntary disability is to address the extent to which
the impairment is voluntary when determining the existence of a disability and when determining
the reasonableness of accommodations. See Lisa E. Key, Voluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A
Reasonable Interpretation of "Reasonable Accommodations," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 97 (1996).
Permitting employers to question the necessity of a disabling treatment (or the advisability of
refusing a disabling treatment) at both stages in the litigation would exacerbate the "pre-approval
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presumption of deference should be geared to address this problem. Perhaps
the clearest case in which the presumption is appropriately rebutted is that
of the "uninformed" employee. If an employee has chosen a correction
without expert advice or over the objections of an expert advisor, the
likelihood that the employee is attempting to game the system is higher. It
is also more likely that such uninformed choices are made to advance trivial
interests that do not warrant the ADA's protection. The ADA's concern for
employee autonomy is still relevant, however, even if the employee elects
to proceed without expert advice. Courts should therefore allow employers
to rebut the presumption of deference to employee decisions by
demonstrating that the employee chose a disabling correction for a pre-
existing disability without the advice of or over the objection of a treating
physician or other relevant expert. 67 The court would then entertain an
inquiry into the necessity or appropriateness of the correction with the aid
of any relevant expert testimony that the defendant and the plaintiff wish to
present."es
Undoubtedly, there are other situations in which an employer may
appropriately rebut the presumption of deference to the judgment of an
individual and his or her treating physician. It is not the goal of this Note to
provide an exhaustive list of such situations. Moreover, it is admittedly one
of the flaws of the presumption-of-deference approach that evidentiary
standards will often constrain an employer's opportunity to rebut this
presumption.' 9 However, when an individual's ability to make personal
effect" described above and would increase the extent to which the employer could impose upon
an employee's treatment decisions.
167. Admittedly, the cases involving truly "uninformed" employees would be exceedingly
rare, as most treatments that would have side effects significant enough to be considered disabling
(such as a prescription drug therapy or surgical treatment) would require physician approval.
Thus, this caveat would more frequently be utilized in the context of those employees who refuse
to employ mitigating measures prescribed by their physicians. For example, employers would be
permitted to question legitimately whether they are obligated to accommodate those individuals
who refuse to take prescribed medications. See, e.g., Bowers v. Multimedia Cablevision. Inc., No.
CIV.A. 96-1298-JTM, 1998 WL 856074, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1998) (ruling that a "plaintiff
cannot gain ADA protection by unilaterally deciding, without justification, not to use prescribed
medication which corrects or alleviates his condition").
168. This approach to identifying voluntary disabilities necessarily gives great weight to the
opinion and expertise of the treating physician. There are, of course, problems inherent in placing
such emphasis on a medical professional's "validation" of impairments as a precondition to a
finding of disability. See Crossley, supra note 24, at 689-96 (critically assessing the "medical
model" of disability).
169. For example, it seems logical that an employer should be able to rebut the presumption
of deference by demonstrating that an employee has selected a corrective procedure or technology
solely for trivial cosmetic or recreational reasons unrelated to the overall health and well-being of
the employee. However, given that this rebuttal criterion has the potential to involve the courts in
probing deeply personal thought processes of employees, the most applicable evidence is likely to
be conversations that are subject to the doctor-patient privilege. Though it might otherwise be
appropriate to permit an employer to prove that an employee had trivial reasons for choosing a
particular correction, the courts should not waive any evidentiary privileges to allow employers to
probe employee motivations.
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health decisions independent of any influence by his or her employer is at
stake, it seems appropriate to err on the side of protecting the employee's
autonomy. The courts should take care not to allow the rebuttal criteria to
multiply to the point at which the presumption is easily rebutted. Though
this "strong-presumption" approach may give rise to the occasional
situation in which an employer must accommodate the limitations of an
individual whose doctor has approved an unnecessarily disabling treatment,
such instances will undoubtedly be rare. As detailed above, there is no
incentive for an individual to choose an unnecessarily disabling treatment in
order to receive workplace accommodations. Therefore, there are very few
compelling reasons to allow an employer with limited medical expertise to
challenge the medical judgements of a knowledgeable employee and his or
her physician. Moreover, even a minimal regard for the autonomy of
individuals with disabilities demands that employers and the courts respect
an individual's personal medical decisions about treatment options.
Only by retaining a strong presumption in favor of employees'
decisions can the courts ensure that an employee who makes the difficult
decision to use a disabling correction in order to remain in the workplace
will not be discouraged by the threat of discrimination. Moreover, such a
presumption of deference would also help to ensure that individuals such as
the plaintiff in Berk v. Bates Advertising USA, 7 ' who, in order to remain in
the workforce, undergo highly invasive treatments that will forever restrict
them from engaging in major life activities, are not subjected to the
humiliating prospect of having to justify to their employers' satisfaction
why the difficult medical decisions that they made were in fact
"acceptable." Finally, a strong presumption that can be rebutted only in the
most egregious cases maintains the broad disabling corrections corollary to
the correctable disabilities rule and also strikes a proper balance between
the ADA's concern for enhancing the employment opportunities of
individuals with disabilities and the Supreme Court's concern for limiting
trivial claims on judicial resources.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in the correctable disabilities cases
provoked significant popular controversy because the majority opinions
seemed to call into question commonly held beliefs about the scope and
power of the ADA. It is still unclear what the precise legal effect of these
decisions will be. Both the EEOC's reaction to these decisions and the first
lower-court interpretations will be critical in determining the impact that the
Sutton line of cases will have on the protections available to individuals
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with disabilities in the workplace. If the EEOC and the lower courts adopt
the interpretation of Sutton espoused by many in the popular media and
concede that the ADA's workplace protections have been effectively
gutted, the impact on individuals with disabilities will likely be so severe as
to necessitate a complete reworking of the statute by Congress. A less
sweeping interpretation of the majority's holding in these cases could avoid
such a drastic outcome by targeting the decisions to affect only those
individuals with impairments that are relatively trivial and can be easily and
completely corrected.
If lower courts read Sutton carefully and espouse a moderate
interpretation of the decision, the Supreme Court's holding will not spell
the end of Title I's workplace protections for individuals with disabilities.
Indeed, this opinion can and should be read to articulate a powerful and
consistent vision of the ADA, instructing courts and employers to "take
people as they are" when evaluating employees' eligibility for the ADA's
protections. Critical to this moderate interpretation of the correctable
disabilities cases is a broad reading of the majority's apparently calculated
restriction on the reach of its own holding to exclude disabling corrections.
Just as lower courts should "take people as they are" when evaluating
myopic individuals who use glasses to correct their visual impairments,
these courts must also take people as they are when evaluating epileptic
individuals who are experiencing short-term side effects while adjusting to
a new regimen of medications.
This permissive interpretation of the "disabling corrections" language
in Sutton is necessary to ensure that the large number of individuals who
must use treatments with significant side effects in order to correct their
underlying impairments remain protected by the ADA. Excluding
individuals who utilize such disabling corrections from the ADA's
protections is inconsistent with the pro-work, pro-mitigation policy goals
underlying both the ADA and the Sutton opinion. It violates both our
national interests and our most basic notions of fairness to permit
workplace discrimination against individuals who endure severe and
disabling side effects in order to remain self-sufficient participants in the
national economy.
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